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Abstract
The media bias literature has focused its attention on single-ideology
media rms. We analyze the incentives for media rms to adopt a
multi-ideology strategy. A multi-ideology strategy occurs when a me-
dia rm adapts news to consumerspolitical preferences. In this sense,
news customization can reduce media bias, since media rms can cover
a larger variety of political opinions. We show that although the incen-
tives to customize are larger under duopoly than under monopoly, a
monopolist might also end up o¤ering customized news to consumers.
In this sense, we argue that the competition policy for the media
sector should take into consideration not only media concentration
issues, but also the plurality of political opinions embraced inside a
media rm.
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1 Introduction
The market for news is central for political and economic outcomes. It is ac-
knowledged that the media industry has an important weight in the political
process, due to the considerable inuence on the public opinion (Stromberg,
2001, 2004a, 2004b; Besley and Burgess, 2002; Eissensee and Stromberg,
2007). In a similar fashion, freedom of the press impacts economic perfor-
mance through a variety of channels, corruption being the most obvious one
(Mauro, 1995; Svensson, 2005; Svensson and Reinikka, 2005).
The economics literature, however, shows that media bias is a pervasive
characteristic of media markets (see Baron, 2006; Besley and Prat, 2006;
Gabszewicz et al., 2001; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006a; Mullainathan and
Shleifer, 2005)1. In particular, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) argue that
media bias results from either supply side or demand side forces. Accordingly,
supply side driven media bias can be the outcome of journalists private
information (Baron, 2006), media capture by interest groups (Besley and
Prat, 2006) or advertisers pressure (Gabszewicz et al., 2001)2. In turn,
demand side driven media bias can emerge as a consequence of consumers
prior beliefs (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005).
Given the tendency of media markets to bias news (either because of
supply or demand side forces), the main question in the literature has been
if competition can reduce the media bias. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008)
give an excellent review on the topic. They argue that competition can in
principle restrain supply side driven media bias but not necessarily demand
side driven media bias.
We start with the supply side driven media bias. First, competition can
ensure greater independence of the media agencies from interest groups, given
that it is more di¢ cult for a single interest group to control all media rms
(see Besley and Prat, 2006). Second, competition augments the number of
the media sources that consumers may have access to, and this can allow
1For empirical studies see Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006b) on the war in Iraq; DellaVigna
and Kaplan (2007), Gentzkow, (2006) and Larcinese et al. (2007) on the 2002 US election;
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) on the satellite network Al Jazeera; Groseclose and Milyo
(2005) on the dispute in the US over the liberal versus conservative lean of the US media
industry; and Durante and Knight (2009) on the intermingling between politicians and
media groups in countries like Italy.
2On the inuence of interest groups on media rms see also Noam (1987); Schulz and
Weimann (1989); Baron (2005) and Bovitz et al. (2002).
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consumers to form more accurate beliefs, once they can combine information
from several sources (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005)3. Third, competition
can conduce to more investment by media agencies in quality and information
gathering (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008), in order to beat up competition.
When the media bias is demand side driven, however, the case for more
competitive markets is not so clear: competition can either increase or de-
crease media bias (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008). Competition might increase
media bias mainly due to two channels. First, under competition media rms
might have stronger incentives to satisfy consumerspolitical preferences than
under monopoly (see Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005), given that they do
not wish to lose market share to competitors. Second, competition can pro-
voke a race to the bottom in terms of the relation between hard and soft
news, i.e.: media rms might increase the quantity of soft news and reduce
the quantity and quality of hard news (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008)4. How-
ever, competition may also help to reduce demand side driven media bias via
the reputation channel (Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006a). Accordingly, only
with competition can consumers have access to independent sources of infor-
mation that provide ex-post verication of the reported news by rival media
agencies. In this sense, reputation can be a stimulus to reduce the media
bias, because deterioration of a media rms reputation decreases sales.
Given the discussion above, it might be argued that there is some room
for media regulation, especially when in the presence of demand side driven
media bias. The case to restrict competition through regulation or state
ownership of the media, however, nds little support in the data. In fact,
Djankov et al. (2003) show evidence that the media bias problem is more
severe when the media outlets are publicly owned5. The question is then
if the media market will generate a type of competition that reduces bias.
In this sense, as defended by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008), the relevant
denition of competition in the media markets di¤ers from that in standard
consumer markets. While for the latter the denition rests on competition in
the consumer market (i.e.: concentration issues), for the former this denition
3The problem with this argument is the rational ignorance model of Downs (1957). In
particular, it might be too expensive for consumers to collect information on all relevant
issues, given the small payo¤ they receive in return (see also Coase, 1974).
4Hard news refers to political informative news (like the construction of a new airport)
and soft news to entertainment news (like the life of celebrities).
5There are, however, some important exceptions such as the British public television
BBC (see Prat and Stromberg, 2005).
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has to be complemented with competition in the information market, i.e.: if
di¤erent political views nd voice in the media market.
Our paper starts from Gentzkow and Shapiros (2008) denition of com-
petition in media markets and focus on demand side driven media bias, since
this is more sensible to competition issues. In particular, we examine the role
of competition when media rms can customize news to readerspolitical
preferences. News customization materializes when a media rm simultane-
ously covers di¤erent political views. The main idea in the paper is, then,
that news customization can reduce the media bias because, independently
of competition in the market, if a rm customizes news it covers a broader
political spectrum.
The motivation to analyze the e¤ects of news customization in media
bias comes from recent competitive trends in media markets, especially the
Internet. Some media experts defend that the Internet has boosted me-
dia rmscapacity to customize news (see Sunstein, 2006, and Gentzkow,
2007). First, as highlighted by the business and marketing literature (see
Balasubramanian, 1998; Bernhardt et al., 2006; Chen, 2006;Dewan et al.,
2000, 2003; Gal-Or and Gal-Or, 2005; Jiang et al., 2006 and Syam et al.,
2005), the new communication and information technologies (such as the In-
ternet) has allowed rms to hyper-targetand tailor products to consumers
more e¢ ciently by reducing the costs to screen consumerspreferences. In
fact, competition in media markets has started to migrate from traditional
mediums (such as paper print or TV) to the Internet (see Gentzkow, 2007).
At the same time, the Internet has increased not only media rmsca-
pacity to customize news products, but also media rms ability to price
discrimination (see Anderson, 2009). First, as noted above, the Internet re-
duces the costs of gathering information and of targeting products directed
to consumerspreferences. In this way, price discrimination is becoming an
important tool for media rms which operate on the Internet. Take the ex-
ample of the online editions of newspapers. The online editions of the most
internationally known newspapers (such as The Economist, The Financial
Times, The Guardian, Le Monde, The New York Times, Newsweek, The
Times, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal) have a non-premium version
(that can be accessed free of charge) and a premium version (where read-
ers pay a fee). In the non-premium version, consumers only have access to a
very limited range of services (for example, consumers can only read the news
headlines). On the contrary, in the premium version readers have access to a
larger range of services and news (like opinion articles, the complete version
4
SNF Working Paper No 14/10
of the printed edition, the back catalogue and other services)6.
Following the literature on media bias, we then model consumerspolit-
ical preferences on the Hotelling (1929) line (see Mullainathan and Shleifer,
2005). Consumers have an ideal-political ideology and they experience disu-
tility when they consume news that does not conform to their views. The
Hotelling line, therefore, introduces a demand side driven media bias through
consumerspreferences. We allow for supply side driven media bias by as-
suming that rmslocation on the Hotelling line is xed. Accordingly, media
rms will always report biased news according to their xed political location.
At this point enters customization of political news by media rms. In
particular, media rms can choose between a single-ideology strategy (i.e.: a
point on the Hotelling line), or a multi-ideology strategy by adapting news to
consumers preferences (i.e.: a line segment on the Hotelling line). We then
ask the following question, given that media rms will always report news
that conform with their political orientation (which is xed on the Hotelling
line, i.e.: supply side driven media bias), what occurs if the media rms can
choose to report more than the single opinion to which they subscribe?
In order to study these issues, we follow Dewan et al.s (2003) modeling
framework of customization in consumer markets. In particular, when a
rm decides to customize it has to weight the costs of customization (i.e.:
adapting news products to consumerspolitical preferences) with the benets
of customization (i.e.: price discrimination). Price discrimination opens up
the possibility for media rms to extract the full surplus from consumers,
and therefore it can also make it more protable for them to cover di¤erent
opinions in the market (i.e.: reduce the media bias)7. We di¤er from Dewan
et al. (2000, 2003), given that they use the Salop (1979) model while we use
the Hotelling one. In our context, the Hotelling model has the advantage of
having a straightforward political ideology interpretation in terms of left and
right politics.
Our objective is to analyze the e¤ects of competition and news customiza-
tion on media bias and media provision. In this sense, we analyze whether the
incentives to news customization di¤er under the duopoly and the monopoly
market structures. We show that although the incentives to news customiza-
6The other advantage of this strategy, besides price discrimination, is obviously adver-
tisement revenues (see Anderson, 2009).
7Our paper is di¤erent from the spatial price discrimination literature (see for example
Thisse and Vives, 1988; Eber, 1997 and Braid, 2008), where rms o¤er only one product
but price discriminate between consumers at di¤erent locations.
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tion are stronger under the duopoly case, a monopolist might also end up
o¤ering customized news to consumers. We then argue that the competition
policy for the media sector should take into consideration not only media con-
centration issues but also the plurality of political opinions embraced inside
a media rm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
introduce the basic model of editorial political orientation and dene news
customization. In the third and fourth sections, we study the monopoly and
duopoly cases, respectively. We conclude by discussing our results.
2 The Model
We adopt the demand side driven media bias modeling strategy of Gab-
szewicz et al. (2001) and Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), by assuming
that political preferences are distributed on the Hotelling (1929) line8.
We di¤er from the standard media bias approach of Gabszewicz et al.
(2001) and Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) in two ways. First, in order to
introduce supply driven media bias, we assume that media rmspolitical
location on the line is xed (i.e.: media rms have a xed political leaning).
Second, with the aim of studying the e¤ects of news customization on media
bias, we depart from the single-ideology media rmsframework, by consider-
ing multi-ideology media rms. Accordingly, single-ideology rms only cover
a point on the line, while multi-ideology rms cover a line segment (i.e.: un-
der customization, media rms can choose to o¤er customized news in terms
of political orientation to consumers on the customized line segment)9.
We then follow Dewan et al.s (2003) customization set-up for conven-
tional consumer markets and adapt it to media markets. The di¤erence rela-
tively to Dewan et al. (2003) is that while they use the Salop (1979) circle, we
use the Hotelling (2009) line. This allows us to give a political interpretation
to our media bias model in terms of right and left wing politics.
To assess the e¤ects of competition on media bias, we analyze two market
structure cases: monopoly and duopoly.
8Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), contrary to our paper, add a behavioral framework
to the Hotelling model.
9The idea to model customization in a continuous spectrum is usually attributed to
Mussa and Rosen (1978). However they analyze vertical product di¤erentiation and not
horizontal product di¤erentiation as we do.
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ConsumersPreferences. As in Hotelling (1929), we assume that con-
sumers are uniformly distributed on a line of length one: [0; 1]. The line
represents readerspreferences in terms of political opinion. Political orien-
tation is ordered from left to right: 0 far left and 1 far right. We dene t
as the intensity of the readerspolitical preferences (i.e.: transport costs in
Hotelling). Readers patronize only one media outlet (i.e.: consumers have
unit demands). In this way, we introduce demand side driven media bias
since readers have an ideal-political opinion and they incur a disutility from
buying a newspaper with a di¤erent political orientation from their ideal one.
The location of a media rm on the line is interpreted as the newspapers
editorial political orientation. In the duopoly cases, the two editorial rms
are labeled as i = L;R. We assume that newspaper L is left oriented and
newspaper R is right oriented and that the two media rms are located at
the opposite extremes of the line: rm L is located at point xL = 0 and rm
R is located at point 1  xR = 1 (see gure 1). In the monopoly case, we x
the location of the monopolist at x = 0 (gure 1 can then be directly applied
to the monopoly cases by disregarding rm R)10.
With the purpose of considering supply side driven media bias, the po-
litical locations of the media rms are exogenously xed on the line. This
case can be seen as a situation where journalists, owners or interest groups
determine the political orientation of the media outlet. The objective of this
set-up is to analyze if news customization can reduce media bias even when
media rms cannot choose political orientation.
To our knowledge, most models that use the Hotelling framework to study
media bias assume that media rms can only supply the media market with
one political opinion (xL and xR, for rm L and rm R, respectively), i.e.:
single-ideology media rms. We di¤er from this approach by opening up
for media rms to customize news to consumerspolitical preferences. Ac-
cordingly, in our model rms can become multi-ideology rms by covering
di¤erent political locations.
We then denote by ki the media rms customization scope, which equals
the length of the Hotelling line chosen to be customized, i.e.: 0  ki  1,
with i = L;R under duopoly (or 0  k  1 under monopoly). Media
rms can then decide to adopt a single-ideology strategy or a multi-ideology
10The equilibrium of the game is not qualitatively changed if we assume that the mo-
nopolist is exogenously located at any point on the line. The same occurs in the duopoly
case if the duopolists are symmetrically located on the line.
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strategy. A single-ideology strategy corresponds to a single point on the
line (duopoly: xL = xR = 0; monopoly: x = 0), while a multi-ideology
orientation corresponds to a line segment (duopoly: [0; kL] and [1  kR; 1];
monopoly: [0; k]).
With a single-ideology strategy, a media rm only subscribes to one po-
litical orientation, i.e.: a media rm o¤ers a standard news product to con-
sumers with di¤erent political orientations. In turn, with a multi-ideology
strategy, a media rm covers di¤erent political ideologies. Accordingly, with
this business strategy, a media rm o¤ers customized news to consumers in
the customized segment and standardized news to consumers in the stan-
dard segment (see gure 1). In other words, consumers in the customized
segment pay for news that mirror exactly the political orientation that they
subscribe to, while in the standard segment, readers pay for news that are
closest to the ideal-opinion to which they subscribe. Below we present the
specic customization technology available to media rms.
Denoting a readers political opinion location on the line as x, the utility
from a reader can then be measured as:
U = v   pi   t (x  ki) , i; j = L;R and i 6= j (1)
Where v is a positive constant and pi is the price of newspaper i (with
i = L;R). Given that location is exogenous, in order to simplify the cal-
culations we assume linear transport costs11. Furthermore, in the duopoly
case, we assume that the parameter v is su¢ ciently large to ensure complete
market coverage. Since in the monopoly case there is only one rm, the
utility expression for the monopoly market structure case is obtained by just
dropping subscripts.
Technology: News Customization. Media rms produce at constant
marginal costs (zero without loss of generality). In spite of being restricted
in terms of political orientation, media rms are prot maximizing organiza-
tions12. In this paper, we are in particular interested in rmsincentives to
customize news to consumerspolitical preferences. When deciding on the
news customization e¤orts, rms face a trade-o¤ between the costs and the
11As shown by DAspremont et al. (1979), if location is endogenous, a location equilib-
rium only exists with quadratic transport costs.
12Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006b), provide evidence that at least for the US media mar-
ket, media rms maximize prots.
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benets of customization. The costs arise through the adaptation of news
to di¤erent consumerspolitical preferences and the benets accrue through
the possibility to price discriminate amongst the customized consumers.
Like in Dewan (2003), we assume that in order to customize, rms have
to incur a customization cost (C) that equals:
Ci =
k2i
2
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (2)
Where  represents the informational and exibility costs to adapt to the
readerspolitical preferences. In this sense, the customization costs can be
seen as diseconomies of scope, given that costs increase with the number of
customized products o¤ered13.
For a better understanding of the customization formalization in the
model, some remarks should be made. First, since rm L and rm R are
located at 0 or 1, respectively, the media rm L can only customize to the
right of 0 and the media rm R can only customize to the left of 1 (see gure
1).
Second, as shown in gure 1, a media rm can have at most two polit-
ical orientations that are consumed in the standard segment: the duopolist
location, xL = 0 and xR = 0 (and x = 0 in the monopoly case); and, in
the case of news customization, the end point of the customization scope, kL
and 1   kR (and k in the monopoly case). Accordingly, the location of the
rm always represents a standard product since a media rm, independently
of news customization, will always deliver the political view mirrored by its
location on the line14.
Third, we assume that the political location of a media rm also deter-
mines where on the line it can customize. Accordingly, a newspapers cus-
tomization segment is contiguous to the rms political location (see gure
1). In this sense, the left leaning newspaper (L) cannot customize separately
from point xL = 0 (and the same holds for rm R). The reasons for this to
occur might be related with either: (1) the political preferences of owners,
13Besides the quadratic costs of customization, Dewan et al. (2003) also have a linear
cost of customization. The inclusion of a linear cost of customization in our model does
not change our results, and therefore, for simplication we eliminate it from the analysis.
14In other words, if a rm customizes, the end point of the customized segment is in
practice the only news product that the rm sells to the standard segment. However, since
we do not know a priori if a rm is going to customize or not, the location of the rm is
always considered to be a standard news product, even if a posteriori it ends up not being
consumed by any consumer as a standard news product.
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journalists or interest groups; or (2) technological restrictions, in particular
diseconomies of scope. In the rst case, owners, journalists or interest groups
might not be willing to publish away from their political area. In the second
case, it might be too expensive to o¤er news products that are distant from
the rms ideological location15.
Finally, given that consumers buy at most one product, in the duopoly
cases we need to restrict the customization scopes of the two rms to not
overlap. In the monopoly cases such a problem does not arise, since there is
only one rm in the market.
The advantage of customization, following Dewan et al. (2003), is the
ability to price discriminate. In particular, if rms do not customize news
(as in the standard segment), media rms cannot price discriminate between
di¤erent readers, because consumersideal political orientation is not o¤ered.
As a result, media rms can only charge the standard products price pi, with
i = L;R.
On the contrary, under customization the media rms can price discrimi-
nate, since they o¤er political news tailored to the consumerspolitical pref-
erences. Accordingly, in the customized segment the rm can charge the
customized consumer the standard products price (pi, with i = L;R) plus
the t cost of adapting the customized product from the closest standard
product. The t cost equals the distance to the closest standard product
times transport costs (t), since rms under customization are able to extract
the full surplus from the customized consumer.
Consider the example of rm L (see gures 1 and 2). As we have seen
above, rm L can have at most two standardized political opinions (points
0 and kL) and a series of customized political opinions on the line segment
[0; kL]. Suppose that consumer x is located in the customized segment [0; kL]
and that the closest standard political opinion is the location of rm L,
xL = 0. We then have that pL + tx is the price charged by the news rm L
to consumer x. More generally, under the duopoly game we have16:
15For example, to customize away from the newspapers political core, the media rm
might need to hire a complete new journalist sta¤ with knowledge of the opposite political
area (conversely, when customization is contiguous to the newspapers political core, the
media rm might be able to continue to use the same sta¤).
16In the case that a rm customizes, it could be argued that the price discrimination
scheme should be made in relation to the end point of the customized segment (kL or
1   kR). Accordingly, a rm could extract higher surplus from the consumers located at
the extremes of the line. If we do this however, the duopoly game is not well behaved
10
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If 0 < x < kL
2
) pL + tx
If kL
2
< x < kL ) pL + t (kL   x)
If 1  kR < x < 1  kR2 ) pR + t (x  (1  kR))
If 1  kR
2
< x < 1) pR + t (1  x) (3)
The price discrimination scheme for the monopoly case is basically the
same as for the duopoly case, except for the fact that there is only one rm
in the market.
Note that the computation of the revenues from the customized segment
can be extremely simplied with the aid of symmetry. Accordingly, as we
have seen, if rm L customizes news it has two standard products. Therefore,
the customized segment can be divided into two equally sized line segments
(

0; kL
2

and

kL
2
; kL

). In this sense, in the customized segment, we have two
symmetric consumers in terms of distance to the closest standardized news
product o¤ered. To see this more clearly, take again the example above.
However, suppose now that the closest standard product is kL (instead of
0). The price of the customized political opinion for this consumer is then
pL + t (kL   x). However, given the symmetry, for two di¤erent readers in
the customized segment of rm L, but located at an equal distance from the
two standardized political orientations of rm L (0 and kL), the price is the
same; i.e.: if x = kL   x, then pL + tx = pL + t (kL   x).
We can then show that prots in the customized segment for rm L equal
(and symmetrically for rm R):
Z kL
2
0
(pL + tx) dx+
Z kL
kL
2
(pL + t (kL   x)) dx = 2
Z kL
2
0
(pL + tx) dx (4)
Prots for rm L and rm R are then equal to:
i = pi (Di   ki) + 2
Z ki
2
0
(pi + tx) dx  Ci, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (5)
Where Di is the demand for newspaper i, with i; j = L;R. Accordingly,
DL = x
 and DR = 1  x, where x is the reader who is indi¤erent between
since the SOC for customization is not satised.
11
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0 1
Customized
segment L
Customized
segment R
Standard
segment L
Standard
segment R
kL kR
Note: L and R are located at point 0 and 1, respectively. Consumer x* is indifferent
between buying from L or R. Point kL is the end point of the customization scope of
firm L. Point 0 and kL are the standard news of firm L. If kL=0, L only offers the
standard news 0. If kL>0, L offers customized news to consumers located between
[0, kL] and offers the standard news kL to buyers in the standard segment [kL,x*] .
Similar interpretation holdsfor R.
kL 1-kRx*
Figure 1: Customization: L located at 0 and R at 1
buying news from rm L or rm R (D = x for the monopoly case). The rst
term in the prot expressions above refers to the revenues from the standard
segment, while the second term represents the revenues from the customized
segment (see gures 1 and 2).
Timing of the Games. We exemplify the timing of the games by the
duopoly case, since the timing in the monopoly case follow directly by ignor-
ing one of the rms. In the rst stage, rms choose customization levels (ki,
with i = L;R). In the second stage, rms choose prices (pi, with i = L;R)17.
In this sense, the customization stage is a kind of pre-market stage (like
investment in R&D or capacity).
Truth. The central question in the media bias literature is to analyze
whether rms have incentives to not report news accurately. In this sense,
"truth" can be any point on the line T 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, media bias in our
model arises if the reported news (for rm L point 0, and for rm R point 1)
di¤er from the truenews, i.e.: if T 6= 0 and T 6= 1. Given that locations are
xed, there are very high chances that this happens very frequently, unless
rms customize news.
17As discussed above the price of the customized product equals the price of the stan-
dardized product plus the t cost.
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Price
Price standard
news, pL
0
Customized
segment L
kL x*
t(kL/2) +pL
=t(kL-(kL/2)) +pL
x kL/2
Standard
segment L
Lpxt +
Figure 2: Price Discrimination: L located at 0
The main idea in the paper is then that news customization can increase
the chances of reporting the truth, because rms report a segment of the
line and not only one point on the line. In the next sections we analyze the
validity of this claim. We start with the monopoly case and then move on to
the duopoly case.
3 Monopoly Market Structure
In the monopoly case, we drop subscripts for rm identity, since there is only
one rm. As usual, the model is solved by backward induction, starting by
computing the equilibrium price (p) and then the customization level (k).
First, however, we need to nd the consumer that is indi¤erent between
buying and not buying the newspaper. The indi¤erent consumer x is the
one that makes v   p  t (x   k) = 0:
D = x = v p+tk
t
(6)
Prots for the monopolist are then:
13
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 = p
 
v p+tk
t
  k+ 2Z k2
0
(p+ tx) dx  C (7)
As mentioned above, the rst term in the prot expression refers to the
revenues from the standard segment, while the second term represents the
revenues from the customized segment (see gure 1).
Stage 2: Price. In the second stage, the monopolist chooses the price
of the standard news product (p). The monopolist price can be found by
maximizing the prot expression (equation 7) in relation to p. The rst
order condition (FOC) for prices simplies to:
@
@p
= tk 2p+v
t
(8)
Solving the previous equation for p, we obtain the equilibrium price:
p = (v+kt)
2
(9)
Note that the second order condition for prices (SOC) is always satised
since d
2
dp2
=  2
t
< 0.
Stage 1: News Customization. In the rst stage, the monopolist chooses
the customization level (k). The monopolist customization e¤ort can be
found by maximizing the prot expression (equation 7) with respect to k.
The FOC for customization, after substituting for p (from equation 9), equals:
@
@k
= (v+2k(t ))
2
(10)
Note that for the SOC for customization to hold we need that d
2
dk2
=
  (2 t)
2
< 0. This is so if  > t
2
.
The monopolist customization level can be found by solving the previous
equation for k:
k = v
2( t) (11)
It can be easily seen that news customization increases with the intensity
of the readerspolitical preferences (t), but decreases with the informational
and exibility costs to adapt to the readers political preferences (). In
addition, k > 0 if and only if  > t. Therefore for t
2
<  < t, k = 0. In this
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sense, when the costs of customization () are lower than the intensity of the
readerspolitical preferences (t), a monopolist does not always customize.
Then we have:
If  > t! k = v
2( t) > 0
If t
2
<  < t! k = 0 (12)
Substituting for k from equation 12 in equation 9, we can derive the
equilibrium price:
If k = v
2( t) and  > t! p = (2 t)v4( t)
If k = 0 and t
2
<  < t! p = v
2
(13)
The following proposition summarizes the results for the monopoly game.
Proposition 1 In a monopolist media market, a monopolist customizes (i.e.:
k > 0) if  > t. However, if t
2
<  < t a monopolist does not customize (i.e.:
k = 0).
In this sense, if the information and the exibility costs of customization
() are larger than the intensity of the readerspolitical preferences (t), the
monopolist customizes news. When this occurs, media bias is reduced since
a larger spectrum of political ideas is covered in the media market. When
the reverse arises (i.e.: the information and the exibility costs of customiza-
tion are smaller than the intensity of the readerspolitical preferences), the
monopolist tends to not customize. As such media bias is not reduced once
only one political opinion nds voice in the media market.
4 Duopoly Market Structure
We now analyze the case of two editorial outlets, i = L;R, which are located
at point 0 and point 1, respectively.
The consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from rm L and rm R,
x, is the one that makes:
v   pL   t (x   kL) = v   pR   t (1  kR   x) (14)
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Solving for x we obtain:
DL = x
 = pR pL+t(1 kR+kL)
2t
(15)
Remember from above that DL = x and DR = 1  x.
Prots for rm L and rm R are then, respectively:
L = pL

pR pL+t(1 kR+kL)
2t
  kL

+ 2
Z kL
2
0
(pL + tx) dx  CL
R = pR

1  pR pL+t(1 kR+kL)
2t
  kR

+ 2
Z kR
2
0
(pR + tx) dx  CR(16)
As in the previous section for the monopoly case, the rst term of the
prot expressions equals the revenues from the standard segment, and the
second term is the revenues from the customized segment (see gure 1).
Stage 2: Prices. In the second stage, rms choose the prices of the stan-
dard news product (pL and pR). Prices are found by maximizing the prot
expressions (equation 16) with respect to pL and pR, respectively. The FOC
for prices then equals:
@i
@pi
=
(t(ki kj+1)+(pj 2pi))
2t
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (17)
Solving di
dpi
and dj
dpj
for pi and pj (with i; j = L;R and i 6= j), we obtain
the equilibrium prices:
pi =
t(ki kj+3)
3
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (18)
Again, as for the monopoly case, the SOC is always satised since d
2i
dp2i
=
 1
t
< 0, i = L;R.
Stage 1: News Customization. In the rst stage, rms choose cus-
tomization levels (kL and kR). The FOC for customization can be shown to
equal:
@i
@ki
= pi

@Di
@ki
+ @Di
@pj
dpj
dki

+ ki(t 2)
2
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (19)
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We can see that customization choices are a¤ected by a direct (@Di
@ki
) and
a strategic e¤ect (@Di
@pj
dpj
dki
). These terms equal:
@Di
@ki
= 1
2
> 0
@Di
@pj
= 1
2t
> 0
dpj
dki
=   t
3
< 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (20)
While the direct e¤ect of news customization is positive, the indirect e¤ect
is negative. The direct e¤ect is positive, since news customization increases
prots via price discrimination. In turn, the indirect e¤ect is negative because
news customization increases price competition in the standard segment and
consequently reduces the prots from price discrimination in the customized
segment. Remember that the price on the customized segment equals the
price on the standard segment plus the customization cost: if the price of
the standard segment is reduced the total price charged in the customized
segment is also reduced.
It can be easily seen that the direct e¤ect dominates the indirect e¤ect
given that: 
@Di
@ki
+ @Di
@pj
dpj
dki

= 1
3
> 0, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (21)
We can then simplify the FOC for customization (equation 19) by sub-
stituting for pi and pj from equation 18:
di
dki
=
t(3 kj+ki)
9
+ ki(t 2)
2
, i; j = L;R and i 6= j (22)
In turn the SOC for customization equals:
d2i
dk2i
=   (2 t)
2
< 0, i = L;R (23)
Like for the monopoly case, the SOC for customization in the duopoly
market structure is satised for  > t
2
.
Solving di
dki
and dj
dkj
for ki and kj (with i; j = L;R and i 6= j), we obtain
the equilibrium customization levels:
ki =
2t
3(2 t) > 0, i = L;R (24)
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As long as the SOC for customization is satised, the duopolists always
choose positive levels of customization. Furthermore, as for the monopoly
case, news customization increases with the intensity of the readerspolitical
preferences (t); but decreases with the informational and exibility costs to
adapt to the readerspolitical preferences ().
In the duopoly cases, however, we have to assure that the customization
scopes do not overlap. It can be shown that ki < 12 (i = L;R) for  >
7t
6
.
Equilibrium prices can be derived by substituting for ki (i = L;R) from
equation 24 in equation 18:
pi = t, i = L;R (25)
The price of the standard product in a duopoly with exogenous choice of
location equals then the transport costs.
The following proposition summarizes the results for the duopoly game.
Proposition 2 In a duopolist media market with exogenous choice of loca-
tion, the duopolists have symmetric incentives to customize. In particular, a
duopolist customizes and its customization segment does not overlap with the
rivals customization segment if  > 7t
6
.
As such, duopolists have stronger incentives to customize than monopo-
lists, given that the latter only customize for  > t, while the former always
customize. In this sense, a duopoly market structure can reduce the extent
of media bias.
5 Discussion
In this paper, we have analyzed the e¤ects of competition on news cus-
tomization and media bias. We show that, independently of competition,
when media rms tailor news to consumerspolitical preferences, the extent
of the media bias can be reduced, since rms cover a larger variety of political
opinions. In this sense, competition policy for the media sector should take
into consideration not only media concentration issues, but also the scope of
the political orientations followed by a media rm.
The scope of the political orientations followed by a media rm can be
accessed in two ways. First, competition authorities can analyze the di¤er-
ent media products o¤ered by a media group (newspapers, magazines, radio,
18
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television and Internet websites) and their respective political leaning (see
Chan-Olmsted and Chang, 2003). A media group would be considered less
biased if the di¤erent media outlets owned by the media group covered di¤er-
ent political areas. Second, a media bias scrutiny can be done on the coverage
of political sensible news (see Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006b). Accordingly,
a media outlet that gives di¤erent political views on the same piece of news
would be labeled as less biased. In this way, competition authorities would
be able to evaluate the level of news customization and media bias in a media
rm or a media group.
The results obtained here raise some important questions, and therefore
their robustness should be checked. In particular, it would be interesting to
investigate how news customization interacts with a non-uniform distribution
of readers (as for example in Dyck et al., 2008); the quality of the news
(see Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2008); and a vertical integration of information
providers and information distributors (as in Chipty, 2001).
When consumerspolitical preferences are non-uniformly distributed, me-
dia rmsincentives to customize will depend heavily on the political lean of
the majority of the readers. Accordingly, if the majority of the readers are
left oriented, rms will have very little incentive to customize political of-
fers on the right-leaning segment of the market (and vice-versa). Also when
the news can be vertically di¤erentiated in terms of quality (for example
soft versus hard news) and consumers have higher costs in processing the
information related with higher quality hard news, then media rms may
be biased to o¤er lower quality soft news. Similarly, if downstream infor-
mation providers have no free access to information, upstream information
distributors might control what information is passed rstly to downstream
information providers and ultimately to the consumers. In our view, given
the tendency for media rms to conglomerate in media groups, this might
become a problematic issue for media bias and media provision in the near
future.
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